

***Da'wah* and the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election: A Closer Look to *Da'wah* Actors Activism and Methods¹**

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Abstract: This article discusses the intersection between Islamic proselytising (*da'wah*) and politics in contemporary Indonesia. Examining valuable sources, mainly online data, particularly by looking at *da'wah* actors and their methods, the article demonstrated the use of *da'wah* as a political vehicle in electoral politics. Further it concluded that the 2019 presidential election had led to the division within the *da'wah* actors (*da'i*). They were divided along the lines of presidential candidates and this division resonated clearly through their *da'wah* activism. From ideological perspectives, this article further found out that *da'wah* actors and institutions with Islamist ideology inclines to vote for Prabowo Subianto, whereas his rival as well as incumbent president Joko Widodo gained significant support from the traditionalist *Nahdlatul Ulama* and the so-called "moderate Islam" had been central issue dividing the two.

Keywords: *Da'wah* method, presidential election, *da'i* activism, politicising Islam

Abstrak: Artikel ini mendiskusikan sengkabut dakwah dan politik di Indonesia kontemporer. Melalui kajian beberapa sumber penting, termasuk data dari internet, khususnya perilaku aktor dakwah (*da'i*) dan metode mereka, artikel ini menjelaskan penggunaan dakwah dalam politik semakin jelas dalam pemilu presiden tahun 2019. Selain itu juga ditemukan

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adanya perpecahan antar aktor dakwah dan institusi. Mereka terbagi dalam dua kelompok pendukung kandidat utama presiden pada pemilu 2019: Prabowo Subijanto dan Joko Widodo. Dari aspek ideologi, studi ini mempertegas bahwa aktor dan institusi dakwah dengan haluan ideologi Islamis cenderung mendukung Prabowo sebagai presiden, sementara kelompok tradisional Nahdlatul Ulama memberikan dukungan mereka kepada Joko Widodo. Pada masa pemilu ini, Islam moderat menjadi isu penting yang ikut meramaikan kompetisi politik tahun 2019.

Introduction

Da'wah literally means "to proselyte" is a key concept in Islam. The term is particularly aimed at drawing an endless collective effort to create a better and Islamic society and every Muslim is designed to join efforts in *da'wah* activism in accordance to their capacities. Despite its importance, *ulama* have different opinions on the scope of *da'wah* as for whether politics is key part in *da'wah* activism and what it means as better Islamic community (*ummat*).

As elsewhere in the Muslim world, in Indonesia, *da'wah* actors (*dai*) play significant roles in *da'wah* activism. Along with *da'wah* institutions, like Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organization, they engage in *da'wah* activities through multiple methods and media. Their activism however is not limited to affairs directly related to religious issues and causes but includes also in politics through election. In contemporary Indonesia, *da'wah* activism *cum* electoral politics has become a rising trend among *da'wah* actors and institution. It can be seen through their involvement in political campaign supporting candidates in election. Their role in the election is essential as to win the Muslim voters. *Da'wah* activities, such as *Majlis Dhikr*, is essential in this regard. At political rallies and campaigns during the presidential election, we witnessed more *da'wah* actors became active in politics through their *da'wah* activism. A high rank member of Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI Tengku Zulkarnain posted a viral online statement "2019 Replace the President" (Amil Islam Cannel, 2018), whereas a Muslim convert Yahya Waloni crafted a

posting "Stop First, 2019 Replace the President," (Ory Ceramah TV, 2018), Ustadz Haikal Hasan's crafted a posting "This is the Reason for Replacing the President in 2019" with 781 views (Media Da'wah Islam, 2019), Sugi Raharjo known as Gus Nur's "Gus Nur. Addressing Jokowi # 2019 Replace the President which has only 388 views (Haflan Tube, 2018). Importantly, online media have facilitated their *da'wah* activism and political campaign as their postings had been viral in many online platforms. *Clicktivism* has been essential in their activism as their followers raise their "like" button which was arguably translated into their votes (Ahyar & Alfitri, 2019, p. 20).

This study used Bogdan Taylor's a descriptive exploratory approach quoted by Lexy J. Moleong (2002). In collecting the data, the main techniques were used, namely observation, interviews, and documentation of various online media. The interview technique used was a semi-structured interview (Sugiyono, 2010, p. 233), in which the interviewees (*da'wah* actors) were asked for an opinion and ideas about the data found on various social media. The sources of data needed to achieve the targets of this study were: informants, observations, and documentation. The collected data were analyzed, and then explored, abstracted and interpreted. (Bungin, 2010, p. 254).

Methodology

Online Platforms: *Da'wah* Actors and Activism in Electoral Politics

The 2019 elections were a magnet and an extraordinary attraction in the coverage of various social media. Personal accounts from various groups also helped

Findings and Discussion

color the virtual stage with discussion materials surrounding the election. Postings related to politics during the election period were plenty so that cyber war in the media was widespread every day. This frenetic election was sometimes framed by media crews and people in various forms. Twitter tweets along with short video clips, status updates on Whatsapp, election notes on Facebook, blogs, etc. became very common.

In addition, preachers also took part in the political constellation in the 2019 elections. This can be found in several scientific forums and da'wah studies that have been scattered on various social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Blogs, YouTube and so on.

Sometimes these preachers do not upload their own content in the 2019 elections, but there were third parties who made it viral. Usually, in every recitation there is a live video streamed by a recitation committee or a member of the congregation. They also upload recorded events on social media so that it can be accessed by others. This sharing method is very effective and very economical because it only relies on very minimal internet quota. To upload this data, it does not take a professional, because some novice can easily do it. The presence of features in the android application makes it easy to edit videos and images to fit the user's taste. Those with little experience and have no critical mind will usually accept what they get in the media as facts due to the same motives and interests in certain candidates for president and vice president. More often than not, the viral propagation of political discussion in the 2019 election was due to postings from certain accounts that some people deemed as inappropriate and needed to refute previous uploads by voicing various criticisms and other notes. The preaching rebuttal also goes hand in hand in a video ((Karaguci07, 2018)) that starts at the 2.13 minute duration and is quoted directly from other preachers such as Habib Taufiq Assegaf, Ustad Abdul Shomad, and Ustad Felix Siauw who all participated in this four-minute and sixteen-second (4:16) video.

Several versions of edited videos with various durations are easily found online with surfers browsing on Google or YouTube directly,

then there will be various versions of the original videos. For example an uploaded video from a Karaguci07 account with the link titled "Astagfirullah (I ask Allah's forgiveness ... KH Ma'ruf Amin & Ministry of Religious Affairs say Merry Christmas, This is a Warning from UAS & Habib Taufiq." Even further Karaguci07 gave the following description: "KH Ma'ruf Amin & Ministry of Religious Affairs Say Merry Christmas, this is a strong reprimand from Habib Taufiq & Ustadz Abdul Somad and an explanation of the Merry Christmas greetings. "This video has been viewed by more than 85 thousand viewers. Karaguci07 uploaded this video in connection with the vice-presidential candidate, KH Ma'ruf Amin, who had made a statement about allowing Muslims to wish Christians a Merry Christmas. KH. Ma'ruf Amin's statement was made in his capacity as part of MUI by giving some explanation of Merry Christmas which in another video KH. Ma'ruf Amin directly said the merry Christmas with the logo "Jokowi Amin for better Indonesia 01."

The rise of politically motivated *da'wah* or the politicisation of *da'wah* is inseparable from the interests of the succession of presidential and vice presidential candidates that it promotes. Some *da'wah* and lectures with political nuances appeared on social media in the form of videos and uploaded on YouTube from the supporters of each candidate pair. This video can still be enjoyed today with a variety of comments and support. Some of the videos of preachers giving support to the pair of candidates for president and vice president appeared to be those that openly wish to replace the president has been consedred a duty and *fardu ain* for every Muslim. Calls from the preachers in the 2019 election political stage were dominated by supporters of candidate pair number 02 Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno. They usually attacked the pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates, Joko Widodo and KH Ma'ruf Amin.

In a cursory search on YouTube by typing "replace president 2019" for example, there will appear religious figures as preachers in

the YouTube catalog such as, Habib Hanif al-Attas,⁵ Ustadz Abdul Somad,⁶ Ustadz Haikal Hasan,⁷ Ustadz Yahya Waloni,⁸ Habib Bahar bin Smith,⁹ KH. Tengku Zulkarnain,¹⁰ Habib Rizieq bin Sihab,¹¹ Ustadz Yusuf Martak,¹² Cak Nun,¹³ Gus Nur,¹⁴ KH. Munawir

⁵ One of the videos by Habib Hanif al-Attas is entitled "Decisive! Habib Hanif al Athos's Lecture on 2019 Change the President" which was uploaded on October 7, 2018 was viewed 31,706 times and got 450 likes and 425 subscribers. (Muhamad Syaui, 2018).

⁶ One of UAS's most phenomenal preaching during the 2019 election according to researchers is his dialog with Mr. Prabowo Subianto in a 13:05 minute long preaching video. The video uploaded by the NgeVlog Guru account on April 11, 2019 was viewed 1,299,757 times, 19 likes, and 45.2k subscribers. (Guru NgeVlog, 2019).

⁷ Ustad Haikal Hassan's lecture that can be a sample of da'wah politicization is a video entitled "Funny Lecture. Ustadz Haikal Hassan. "Dare You??" This 58:47 minute video was uploaded by aku Indonesian Da'wah on September 8, 2018 and got 12,043 views, 157 likes and 17.1k subscribers. (Indonesia Da'wah, 2018).

⁸ Ustadz Yahya Waloni's lecture can be seen in the 18:15 minute video with the title: "Chaos 2019 Change the President Ustadz Yahya Waloni's response." This video was uploaded by the Amil Islam Channel account on May 11, 2018 and was viewed 138,763 times, and got 1.6k likes and 915 comments. (Amil Islam Channel, 2018).

⁹ One of Habib Bahar bin Smith's lectures can be seen in the video entitled "Full lecture of Habib Bahar 2019 Change the President --goosebumps!" Uploaded by Abdul Kholif's account on September 15, 2018. This video lasts for 33:47 minutes and has been viewed 1,216 times, got 10 likes and 139 subscribers. (Abdul Kholif, 2018).

¹⁰ One of KH Tengku Zulkarnain's lectures can be seen in a 25:33 minute video with the title "2019 Change President: KH Tengku Zulkarnain." This video was uploaded by the Amil Islam Channel account on April 24, 2018 and was viewed 520,429 times, got 4.6k likes and 929 comments. (Amil Islam Channel, 2018).

¹¹ One of Habib Rizieq's lectures was during the 212 reunion in Jakarta. The lecture was uploaded by Nasihat Kita Account to YouTube on December 6, 2018 and was viewed 1,374 times, 30 likes and 1.12k subscribers. (Nasihat Kita, 2018)

¹² One of Ustadz Yusuf Martak's lectures was entitled "Praying to Welcome the Victory of Muslims on the Night of the 212-Yusuf Martak Munajat." This video was uploaded on February 22, 2019 and was viewed 1,371 times, got 29 likes, and 19k subscribers. (Video Pribadi, 2019).

¹³ One of Cak Nun's lectures was the upload of the Kalijurang Cannel account on April 16, 2018 with the title "Latest, Cak Nun Angry 2019 Must Change the President." This video has been viewed 3,076 times, got 25 likes, and 875 subscribers. (Kalijurang Cannel, 2018).

Pekayon,¹⁵ etc. Search on this da'wah group has a very clear connotation and political targets. They have a priority target of replacing President Jokowi with the presidential candidate they want, namely Prabowo-Sandi. They conditioned the da'wah as part of the media to reach the audience, the congregation. Da'wah that they delivered has been framed in such a way so that it can be watched for Muslims in various corners of the country. This can be seen from the number of viewers that has reached thousands or even millions of viewers. These videos have a high fighting spirit with a monologue and fiery delivery model. On several occasions they criticized and blamed President Joko Widodo's leadership and often brought personal affairs and talents in religion in the state matters.

On the other hand, in a cursory search on YouTube by typing key words such as "Preaching on President 2019" or "Preaching on Jokowi" or "Da'wah Support Jokowi," then little can be found except a few videos from Mr. Guru Bacang (TGB) Muhammad Zainul Majdi,¹⁶ KH. Muwafiq,¹⁷ Ustadz Yusuf Mansuf,¹⁸ Gus Miftah,¹⁹ KH. Jujun

¹⁴ One of Gus Nur's lectures is a 13:10 minute video uploaded by Islam itu Asyik Account with the title "Decisive Attitude!!! Gus Nur's Lecture: 2019 Obligatory to Change the President!!!" On January 10, 2019 this video has been viewed 1,704 times, got 16 likes, and 5.37k subscribers. (Islam itu Asyik, 2019).

¹⁵ One of KH Munawir Pekayon's lectures was uploaded by Ibrama HMM New account on December 16, 2018. This video has been viewed 19,126 times, got 213 likes, and 167k subscribers. (Ibrama HMM New, 2018)

¹⁶ One of TGB's lectures, Muhammad Zainul Majdi, was a video uploaded by the Nextscene ID account on January 14, 2019 with the title "TGB's Explanation of Jokowi Makes It Emotional." This video has been viewed 798,488 times, got 13k likes, and 13.2k subscribers. (Nextscene ID, 2019).

¹⁷ One of KH's lectures. Muwafiq is a video posted by Wal Yatalatof's account on April 19, 2019 with the title "Gus Muwafiq Response to Abominable Defamation of President Jokowi." This video has been viewed 2,817,286 times, 23k likes, and 57.5k subscribers. (Wal Yatalatof, 2019).

¹⁸ One of the videos from Ustadz Yusuf Mansur relating to the da'wah politicization is a video uploaded to the BeritaSatu account on February 14, 2019 with the title "Special Interview with Claudius Boekan: Jokowi, Da'wah, Ball." This video has been viewed 2,233 times, 31 likes and 1.06m subscribers. (Berita Satu, 2019).

¹⁹ One of Gus Miftah's lectures was a video uploaded to the Juve Multimedia Record account on August 14, 2018 entitled "Message from Gus Miftah for Jokowi and

Junaedi,²⁰ etc. The uploaded videos are less enthusiastic in providing political support to Jokowi than the fiery and passionate first group. This group's videos mostly provide support, imaging, and advocating for the success achieved by President Joko Widodo without vilifying other presidential candidates.

The preachers mentioned above are millennial preachers who are actively involved in various lectures and *majlis* and grow together with the strengthening role of information technology in public life. The impact of technology is the loss of barriers and boundaries of space and time, so the preaching it conveys will be followed by other congregants who are not currently in one halaqah, but can be followed by congregants and people who are in other areas at different times. Understanding the importance of the role of information technology makes the propaganda of the preachers more up to date in accordance with the political climate in the 2019 elections. The activities of the preachers, in addition to the situation faced by the congregation in their respective place, are also related to conditions in other places that also have the same needs. So this millennial preachers are closely involved in information technology, especially social media which is an inseparable part because all of his preaching activities are carried out by involving social media (Nashrillah, 2018, p. 109).

The widespread politicisation of da'wah also involves account holders, consumers, and pilgrims to seek the spread of the message propaganda delivered by the preachers. The spread of this propaganda was made sporadically through various other social media. Such as the upload of Ustad Yahya Waloni's lecture which was distributed by the @musliminangaji account on 29 April 2018 on Facebook (Musliminangaji, 2018) which has been distributed to 90 thousand

Prabowo." This video was viewed 1,124,256 times, 5.6k likes, and 75.4k subscribers. (Juve Multimedia Record, 2018)

²⁰ One of the preaching lectures from KH. Jujun Junaedi is a video entitled "KH. Jujun Junaedi; Following the Direction of Murshid Thoriqoh, Vote for Jokowi-KH. Ma'ruf Amin, "uploaded by the Bintang Sembalin Wali account on December 15, 2018. This video has been viewed 5,075 times, 39 likes, and 23.3k subscribers. (Bintang Sembalin Wali, 2018).

other users, as well as on Twitter (Indonesia_NTB, 2018). The lecture delivered by Ustad Yahya Waloni with duration of 0:32 seconds has been viewed by 7,921 visitors spread throughout the country.

In his lecture, Yahya Waloni said that he was a former infidel and asked whether the recitation of al-Fatihah is correct or not when becoming an imam in congregational prayer at the mosque before the lecture was conducted. In contrast to Mr. Jokowi who was a Muslim from a young age but when he became an imam in congregational prayer, there was a wrong recitation of the seventh verse in Surah al-Fatihah in its *makharijul huruf*. Even Mr. Jokowi's *hauqalah* pronunciation was incorrect. The end of the video, he affirmed that in 2019 it is time for a new president (Indonesia_NTB, 2018).

The same thing happened to preachers or lecturers who supported the presidential and vice presidential candidate pair number 01, Joko Widodo and KH. Ma'ruf Amin. By citing lectures delivered by TGB Muhammad Zainul Majdi for example, bringing a theme of nationalism, then any contestation is to compete in virtues (*fastabiqul khairat*). Furthermore, TGB said that in the 2019 election, they would vote for Jokowi and KH. Ma'ruf Amin. For him, President Jokowi has worked hard but did not boast about it. Even though his votes in NTB and NTT in the 2014 elections were outnumbered by his political opponents, in fact during his tenure, Jokowi continued to work for the progress of NTB and NTT. Even during his visits to NTB and NTT, he showed his seriousness to work and develop NTB and NTT even though the population is only about three million (Next Scene ID, 2019).

The politicisation of the da'wah carried out by the TGB is to straighten out the call of da'wah that has discredited the presidential candidate number 01. The da'wah that he delivered also illustrates how the TGB's relationship with the *habibs* and community leaders to always help in *fastabiqul khairat* but must be morally, must not blaspheme and defame other presidential pair. Even if there is defamation on social media groups such as Whatsapp group (WAG), then the call of the TGB mission is to leave the group because by staying in that group will only cause greater slander (Next Scene ID: 2019).

Regarding the pattern of dissemination which only capitalizes on copy-paste pattern and even clips of a portion of the message of religious sermon of clerics, preachers and religious authorities. Even it has unconsciously formed a moral crime that has become something natural and forms a habit in culture and social structure. The copy-paste culture of the da'wah content is another form of cybercrime by social media accounts so the message of da'wah has no authority anymore. Nevertheless, according to Aris Risdiana and Reza Bakhtiar Ramadhan (2019 p. 136), the phenomenon of the spread of da'wah on social media is evidence of synergy between technology and religion (Islamic da'wah). This phenomenon has contributed to an immoral copy-paste tradition on the one hand, but is morally acceptable since the spread of the message of da'wah is a form of the actualization of da'wah i.e. piety.

The politicisation of da'wah through social media is quite effective and has a very significant influence. Especially for the congregations who share political interests. Responding to the spread of the message of da'wah as well as political calls through social media, the author agrees with the findings of research conducted by Ahyar and Alfitri which states that social media known as Islamic clickifism can be an authoritative method in shaping religious and political discourse (Ahyar & Alfitri, 2019, p. 3).

In communication studies, this is in accordance with the concept of two step flow communication as the transfer of communication through two stages. This concept was first proposed by Katz and Lazarsfeld as quoted by Aris Risdiana and Reza Bakhtiar Ramadhan (2019 p. 136). In this case, the first stage is information spread through the mass media and is received by opinion leaders who have access to the message or sources of information, namely congregants who are present in the ongoing lecture or preaching. These opinion leaders have made recordings using various visual recording devices to obtain digital recordings from the preachers. The second stage, the spread of propaganda messages uploaded to social media that is automatically disputed in the wider community and can be accessed by anyone in various parts of the world.

The propagation of this *da'wah* message that is politically motivated is then accessed by millennials with various mobile devices such as laptops with wired internet and wifi networks and other internet access through Android mobile devices. However, not all of them are able and willing to access this political-based *da'wah* message. The thesis presented by Aris Santoso was based on field observations, that one of the interesting findings is that millennials are not too concerned with all the hassle in the run-up to the 2019 Presidential Election. However, they have their own road map to express their aspirations. So for Aris Santoso, it would be natural for millennials to have no concern for power (Santoso, 2018).

Politicising Islam: *Da'wah* in Indonesian Politics

As the most Muslim populated country, Islam is a key term to understand Indonesian politics. Thus, it is reasonably true that Islam has been a battle discourse to win the heart and the mind of the population and *da'wah* actors play key roles to this goal. The 2019 presidential election, Indonesians witnessed the boiling discourse on Islam involving *da'wah* actors who tried to win their candidate in the election. Here, we enlist some factors that contribute to the politisation Islam in contemporary Indonesian politics by *da'wah* actors.

Elections with Social Disturbance

The endless discussion on print and electronic media to social media about the 2019 elections is allegedly because there are two large "magnets" that affected it (Rahmat, 2019). First, the elections were held simultaneously on April 17, 2019 as the first simultaneous elections in the history of politics in Indonesia. Simultaneous elections of legislative candidates at the regional or city, provincial, to central level, to presidential and vice presidential candidates drew a lot of attention not only from the candidates and the General Elections Commission, but also from sympathizers and party cadres. This simultaneous election certainly increases the complexity of its implementation which implies the increasingly complex problems faced by election stakeholders. the General Elections Commission,

Elections Supervisory Agency, political parties, security forces and their staff were all required to work extra hard for the success of the 2019 elections amid the potential for conflict between contestants and supporters who had been predicted to also increase.

In one of its publications, the *Kompasiana* (2019) mentioned that the simultaneous elections of 2019 had caused a 'headache' for many people, whether they were voters or organizers. Voters in the elections were confused when choosing a candidate. This is due to the large number of legislative candidates from the district to the center. In addition, there was presidential and vice presidential election. The joining of the legislative and presidential elections resulted in voters not really focusing on the candidates of their choice when they cast their ballots. It took some time when voting for candidates.

Dadan Supardan (2019) argued that the simultaneous elections in 2019 had the potential to save money. But in reality, it is not just cost that matters, but lives are at stake. His statement was reviewed in *detik.com* while presenting data on the cost of implementing the 2019 Elections. The government budgeted IDR 25.59 trillion. In the initial preparation in 2017 around IDR 475.71 billion and in 2018 IDR 3.33 trillion. Furthermore, in 2019 it was budgeted at IDR 15.79 trillion. All of this was allocated for the organizations, supervision, and supporting activities such as security, etc. Furthermore, with a simultaneous pattern, the implementation of the 2019 elections can reduce significant costs. Regarding only the costs of election officials' salaries, there was a 50% budget efficiency. The cost of updating voter data can also be cut because it is only done once at the beginning of election preparation. Then the cost of procurement of logistics can be saved by the General Elections Commission from the existing budget because it is carried out electronically through the National Catalog.

Second, the emergence of a generation in the millennial era that is full of distraction in a significant number as voters. Interestingly, this millennial generation has a different character from its predecessor generation. They seemed to be troops and sympathizers whose movements in social media were very fast and unpredictable. Even in some discussions and political commentary it is far from ethics and

manners. For example, Aih Suherman's account (Aih Suherman, 2018) regarding a comment on a video by Ustad Tengku Zulkarnaen entitled "REPLACE THE PRESIDENT 2019 | KH TENGKU ZULKARNAIN." In his commentary, Aih Suherman stated "Ustadz Zulkarnaen will replace the president in 2019? Indonesian president will be replaced by a president of another country? by Donald Trump. Is it possible? Smart or stupid cleric?" This comment reflects political attitudes that are very far from courtesy and political ethics. The commenter could be a "layman" who dared to make indecent comments about Tengku Zulkarnain whom for the public and other supporters is a highly respected figure (Aih Suherman, 2018).

Psychological conditions and the level of education of these millennials which are very diverse and disguised in discussion had a very significant impact as well. For example in the video titled "Gus Muwafiq Answers the Slander against President Jokowi," there is an account of Mas'id Suchaimi who commented: "Sorry, a professor said president is a fool, many also said Jokowi is a traitor, but only Gus Muafiq praises the president. Why is Gus Muafiq different from most other Muslims?" The comment made by this Mas'id account is not as common as other accounts that are always praising the preacher. With a critical tone and a bit of humor, Mas'id wrote his comment but was very unfortunate because he did not get a reply from another account user (Wal Yatalatof, 2019).

This millennial era generation does not yet have a strong ideological foundation and is not accompanied by a reinforcement of character or ethics in using social media. Here lies the distortion which is full of crossings and "cutting the compass." Their assessment of the da'wah that is sometimes led in the political sphere to campaign for a particular presidential candidate pair is judged only from the outside appearance without seeing and studying the hidden meaning of the message conveyed. In this case Levi-Strauss, a structuralist (Putra, 2006, p. 61), argued that each message has a surface structure and deep structure. The surface structure is the relations between the elements that can be made or built based on external or empirical features that appear as they are. While the inner structure is a certain structure that

is built based on the characteristics of the physical structure that is made but not always visible. Usually, this inner structure has hidden meanings and messages that need to be examined further and more thoroughly.

Interestingly, this generation of millennial era that is overwhelmed with distortions by following the sermons of preachers who deliver a call for support for Jokowi has yet to make their choice. When watching a preaching video, at least they can make choices to candidates who have been mentioned in the lecture. This is where the da'wah politicisation plays its role as a hidden message in its deep structure by giving emphasis on certain candidates. For example in the da'wah dialogue between Prabowo Subianto and Ustad Abdul Somad in a 13:05 minute video before the quiet period of the final day of the 2019 election day. The video showcasing a relaxed dialogue in the style of Ustad Abdul Somad's sermons had hypnotized many viewers (Guru Ngevlog, 2019).

Nurul Zaecinta's account gave a very heartfelt comment: "I always have tears in my eyes watching this video. Prabowo is the most sincere person for the Republic of Indonesia ... the late Gus Dur also acknowledged and said so ... may Allah always protect you, sir. I am from Madiun and I always praise you .. even though I also know about your shortcomings ... "Her comment got 18 likes 3 replies, one of which questions the sincerity of Prabowo involved in the tragedy 98. A similar statement was made by the Zalda Salsabila who emotionally stated: "I am crying, O Allah. Hopefully Pak Prabowo will be given the mandate to lead our country, Amen O Allah." This commenry received 45 likes and no to all. Another comment written by Andi Rohandi while reciting Ustad Abdul Somad's words: "don't invite the ulema to the palace (the president should come to the ulema). Don't give a posotion to the clerics (because clerics are not subordinate to the president)," received 176 likes and 20 replies. The phenomenon of millennial generation such as Nurul Zaecinta, Zalna Salsabila, and Andi Rohandi is clear evidence of millennials who watch the propaganda video from its surface structure without seeing the deep meaning as contradicted by other accounts. Of course, this video has

succeeded in attracting audience sympathy and has been viewed by 1,299,736 people and received 45.1k subscriptions since it was uploaded on April 11, 2019 (Guru Ngevlog, 2019).

The simultaneous elections, both for legislative candidates and the president have drawn attention from all walks of life at various levels. It has also justified any means, including the method of preaching with political interests. With the use of information technology that is spread on various social media, the spread of propaganda can be made viral by the congregation.

The Movement of Winning the Muslim Votes: from Preaching to the Ijtima Ulama

The call from the elite to win the votes of Muslims as the dominant population in Indonesia in the 2019 elections was visible on the surface. The emergence of a number of issues which are considered by some Muslims to be detrimental to them eventually gave birth to the first stage of *ijtima'ulama* movement to carry the presidential and vice presidential candidate pairs to their victory. The result of *ijtima'ulama*, in which there is a representation of ulemaa as incumbent challenger recommends Prabowo to choose vice-presidential candidate who comes from the ulemas' circles (nationalist-type presidential-vice presidential pairs). Two figures such as the Chairperson of the Shura Council of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Salim Segaf al-Jufri and the famous cleric, Ustad Abdul Somad appeared on the Prabowo prospective running mate (Zuhri, 2019, p. 73-74).

This group, with its followers' movements, practiced populism as if to "embrace" democracy while urging the ruling regime to accommodate their political interests. At first, the results of the *ijtima'ulama* were very clear in bringing the representatives of the revivalist groups to become representatives of the presidential candidates. As a result, scholars such as Abdul Somad and Salim Segaf Al-Jufri who were closer to the conservative Islam category, were recommended for vice presidential candidates in the 2019 elections. Even though the final results were different, this revivalist group remained in the Prabowo-Sandiaga camp (Fata, 2018, hlm. 339).

The group that is always vis a vis with the state gained momentum in the 212 mass movement on 2 December 2018. Previously, this group was supported in the form of a 'peace' campaign by Prabowo-Sandi, for example the inauguration of the Indonesian Movement for Morning Prayer (GISS) and the 212 Reunion. The form of support by the ulemas was to always refer to the presidential and vice presidential candidates in accordance with their *ijtihad* who are of course Prabowo-Sandi. This pair take advantage of the mass movement which has proven capable of mobilizing the santri circles. Not only was the revivalist group represented by the PKS, but the NU group also participated in escorting the Ulema fatwa (Fata, 2018, p. 339).

Interestingly, the results of the *ulama's ijtima* actually received a rebuttal from other Muslim groups because it was considered not to represent other ulemas. Because, NU, for example, was involved in the *ijtima 'ulama*. Even based on data from Nur Habibi as quoted by R. Siti Zuhri (2019, p. 74), it was mentioned that 400 kiai and boarding school administrators throughout Indonesia gave support to the pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin. As the "biological father of PKB", the de facto political choice of structural NU, in particular, is in line with the political choice of PKB, which is to be part of the incumbent coalition. This can be understood by picking Ma'ruf Amin, chairman of the MUI and general chairman of the PBNU syariah, as Jokowi's running mate. This choice is not only intended to win the support of Muslims, but also at the same time to refute the accusations that say that Jokowi government is anti-Islamic.

The presence of *ijtima 'ulama* initiated by FPI and GNPF-MUI firmly stated that the 212 movement which previously had the main agenda to overthrow Ahok, aims to consolidate Muslims so that they have the awareness to elect leaders, through constitutional channels, through elections, and through the presidential election (Bonasir, 2017). The preaching activities carried out by 212 members, FPI, GNPF-MUI, *Ijtima 'Ulama* carried out in groups in the community, also carried out personally by the movement's leaders, such as Habib Rizieq bin Shihab (Indra, 2016), Habib Hanif al-Attas (Alhamid,

2016), and Habib Bahar bin Smith (Sadikin, 2018) who are FPI main figures. While Ustadz Yusuf Martak (P. Antares, 2019), KH. Tengku Zulkarnain (Affiyah, 2019), Ustadz Haikal Hasan (Fajri, 2019), Gus Nur (Jambak, 2018), and Ustadz Abdul Somad (Zahid, 2018) are figures behind GNPF-MUI and *Ijtima' Ulama*.

Ijtima' ulama occurred not only once. At least, there were *Ijtima' Ulema I*, *Ijtima' Ulama II*, *Ijtima' Ulama III*, and *Ijtima' Ulama IV*. Based on historical records, some of the reviews above are part of *Ijtima' Ulama* stage I which was made by numbers of religious leaders who are members of the National Movement for Guarding Fatwa or GNPF-Ulama, to recommend a vice presidential candidate for Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 Presidential Election. *Ijtima' Ulema* stage I was attended by 600 scholars and national figures from all provinces in Indonesia (P. Antares, 2019).

Ijtima' Ulama volume II occurred on Sunday, September 16, 2018 in Jakarta. In this volume II, a letter of agreement was signed between the presidential and vice presidential candidates, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno, witnessed by all participants of *Ijtima Ulama* II and GNPF officials. The letter was attached to the Decree of *Ijtima Ulama* and National Figures II number 02 / IJTIMA / GNPF-ULAMA / MUHARRAM / 1440 H concerning the Integrity Pact of Candidates for President and Vice President (Rosana, 2018).

Modelling *Da'wah* Politics at the 2019 Presidential Election

Referring to the politicisation of *da'wah* undertaken by each preacher from each pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates, politicisation of *da'wah* is divided into two parts, namely, the group trying to replace the president in the 2019 election, from the President Joko Widodo to President Prabowo Subianto. This group is represented by Habib Rizieq Shihab, Habib Bahar bin Smith, Habib Hanif al-Attos, Ustadz Haikal Hasan, Ustadz Yahya Waloni, KH. Tengku Zulkarnain, Ustadz Joseph Martak, Gus Nur, or KH. Munawir Pekayon. The style of preaching performed by this group is more offensive by justifying all the means and speeches delivered to the audience in

congregation. Offensive remarks to the state officials were also uttered by the preachers of this group.

Based on the track record and profile of each preacher of this first group, the majority of them are revivalist Muslims. their style of preaching is also more ornate and loud. This is because some of the leaders of the first group are the founders and managers of the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) who strongly call for promotion virtue and prevention of vice (Jahroni, 2004, p. 225). So for them, seeing a mischief and tyranny that occurred in the government in the Joko Widodo era, must be changed with their power. One of them is by replacing the president according to the group's version. So this is how the first group's preaching movement is characterized when delivering its political and fervent preaching, although there are preachers such as UAS and Cak Nun who provide different perspectives in their preaching. The politicisation of da'wah of this group has demystified Islamic teachings and da'wah, similar to the Islamic radical groups who call for jihad against religious dissidents in the Jakarta Election. In this different case, the propaganda of radical groups through social media also has implications for the demystification of Islamic teachings and figures who support Ahok in the local election period (Fatmawati, Minangsih, & Noorhayati, 2018, p. 212).

Ustadz Haikal Hasan (Interview with Ustadz Haikal Hasan, 2019), even stated that the movement of this group tends to follow the mindset and model of preaching of Habib Riziq, an FPI figure. In this case, their preaching of *amar ma'ruh nahi munkar* through firm statements about the collapse of people's economy, the leader breaking the promise, the cleric being criminalized, high economic prices, a lot of imported goods from other countries, has become part of the da'wah that is always delivered to the public. Strong criticisms delivered radically and distancing themselves from the state have marked the movement of this group.

Second, the group of preachers who try to provide support to the incumbent president Joko Widodo. This group is represented by several preachers such as Ruan Guru Bacang (TGB) Muhammad Zainul Majdi, KH. Muwafiq, Ustadz Yusuf Mansuf, Gus Miftah, and KH.

Jujun Junaedi. The *da'wah* style carried out by the second group is more persuasive in responding to contemporary political phenomena. At least, their *da'wah* politicisation is persuasive and defensive because it is more explanatory to other preachers. This second group has the educational background of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) such as KH. Muwafiq, Gus Miftah, and KH. Jujun Junaedi; and Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) such as Tuan Guru Bacang (TGB) Muhammad Zainul Majdi, or community organization such as Ustadz Yusuf Mansur. Genealogically, the *da'wah* style displayed by the preachers in the second group is not loud but rather dialogical and persuasive.

Ustadz Yusuf Mansur (Interview with Ustadz Yusuf Mansur, 2019) stated that being positive and persuasive in responding to the *da'wah* phenomena and the political climate in the 2019 elections is a must. So telling people about the good side of President Jokowi as part of the *da'wah* that needs to be delivered to the public. Furthermore, that telling someone's kindness does not have to vilify others. So avoiding the polemic in the 2019 elections by not trying to retaliate and counterattack political opponents is a *da'wah*. Even if there is goodness about other presidential candidates, it must also be delivered as part of the *da'wah*.²¹ Therefore, the *da'wah* dialog he held and spread on social media has shown the openness of the preacher who is tolerant of the political stage in the 2019 elections.

Conclusion

The *da'wah* politicisation in the 2019 elections was orchestrated by several preachers with the aim to campaign for certain pairs of presidential candidates and helped them win the election as well as to overthrow and frustrate other candidates. From the aspect regarding the actors of politicisation, there are two groups of preachers. The first group has very clear political connotations and targets of replacing President Jokowi with the presidential candidate they want, namely

²¹ Yusuf Mansur argues that communicating the good of others should not be related to friends or political opponents. In this case, Yusuf Mansur maintained the hadith Imam Ahmad narrated by Abu Dzar: "Say the truth even though it is bitter." (Interview with Ustadz Yusuf Mansur, 2019).

Prabowo-Sandi. The second group has an orientation to support Joko Widodo as the President and future presidential candidate along with his running mate, KH. Ma'ruf Amin.

The factors that underlie the politicisation of *da'wah* during the 2019 elections in the millennial era are the conditions and the 2019 electoral system carried out simultaneously which include the elections of legislative members, Regional Representatives and the President and Vice President. This simultaneous implementation has drawn everyone's attention, including the preachers who have concern for the change of leadership of the head of state / president as a key to change in the country. The key to this change, according to the first group, is to replace the president. Since winning the presidential candidate (Prabowo-Sandi) is a big hope, the key to success is to gain as many votes as possible. This is where the struggle for the dominant Muslim votes involved the preachers who joined in a number of affiliations by making a joint consensus in the form of *ijtima' ulama* to help the presidential candidate of this revivalist Muslim group to win election. That being said, the politicisation of *da'wah* orchestrated by preachers in every recitation momentum, *majlis ta'lim*, etc., is inevitable.

Meanwhile the typology or character displayed by each of these groups shows that the first group is ideologically affiliated with the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the National Movement for Guarding the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF-MUI), *Ijtimia' Ulama Volume I through volume IV*. This group consists of Muslim revivalists who expect the return of Islamic teachings in every symbol and behavior of the state and nation. Whereas the second group is ideologically affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama or Nahdlatul Wathan. Generally they have a vision of Islam *Wasathiyyah* and are more moderate in dealing with the relationship between Islam and the State.

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